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a b s t r a c t 
Legacy electrical grids are urged to evolve towards smart grids, the smarter power delivery system that 
relies heavily on ICT. Numerous smart grids applications are expected to be developed for eﬃcient man- 
agement and utilization of electricity at the demand side such as home automation, Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI), dynamic energy pricing, eﬃcient load management, etc. For easing and boosting 
the development of new demand side services, the concept of Home Energy Gateway (HEG) has recently 
been proposed in literature. It involves communication with the utility as well as with devices at the 
consumer sites. The literature still lacks a comprehensive HEG design that could provide all essential fea- 
tures such as zero-conﬁguration, auto-discovery, seamless plug & play communication, interoperability 
and integration, customers privacy and communication security. 
This paper addresses the HEG challenges in an effective way through the design of suitable communi- 
cation frameworks and a security mechanism for enabling strong protection against cyber attacks. The 
proposed system effectively copes with the interoperability and integration issues between plethora of 
heterogeneous devices at the consumer sites. The devices in proposed system inherit plug & play fea- 
tures and support zero-conﬁguration and seamless networking. Further, the proposed system design is 
technology-agnostic and ﬂexible enough to be adopted for the implementation of any speciﬁc demand 
side service. This paper also evaluates the proposed system in real-networking environment and presents 
performance metrics. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Today, eﬃcient production, transmission and consumption of 
electricity are becoming increasingly important due to fossil re- 
sources depletion, ever rising cost of electricity and environmental 
concerns [1] . Further, legacy grids have several limitations which 
hinder the integration of renewable energy sources. The evolution 
of legacy grids towards smart grids brings more intelligence for 
eﬃcient Demand Side Management (DSM) by massive integration 
of ICT. The use of ICT enables the development of more advanced 
DSM services which could never be imagined for legacy grids [2–
4] . It also involves consumers for eﬃcient load management e.g., 
smart grid will use dynamic energy pricing [5] . Thinking rational 
economically, customers will cut off un-necessary loads at peak 
demand hours or shift them to low-energy price hours. Smart grids 
are also expected to integrate large number of small and micro dis- 
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tributed generation systems which can be owned by small enter- 
prises or private individuals [6] . Consumers may use self generated 
electricity (e.g., solar panels) during high energy price hours and 
even contribute extra generated electricity to the main grid. 
Amongst the most innovative and challenging opportunities 
brought by the smart grid, there is the design of smart home 
and building automation that can be deployed in both residen- 
tial and commercial buildings [7,8] . Such smart systems eﬃciently 
control all the appliances e.g., air conditioning, heating, refrigera- 
tors, washing machines, TV, computers, etc without requiring any 
physical presence [2] . However, smart systems require an intelli- 
gent device e.g., Home Energy Gateway (HEG) at the consumer 
sites [9,10] . The concept of HEG has been illustrated in Fig. 1 . It can 
be observed that the HEG communicates with all local appliances 
as well as with the utility using available wired/wireless technolo- 
gies. The HEG continuously monitors the state of all appliances and 
manages/controls them for eﬃcient energy management. However, 
the functionalities of HEG could be quite broad and it may also 
provide activity logging or raise alarms/notiﬁcations under certain 
conditions e.g., when energy price changes, load increases beyond 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jii.2017.07.001 
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Fig. 1. Demand side management concept. 
allowed limit from the utility, etc. The HEG can be conﬁgured to 
control the appliances based on their operational importance, en- 
ergy price, current load, amount of local generated electricity from 
solar panels, etc. Note that the HEG could be customized by the 
local consumers but could also be managed by the utility. It en- 
ables the utility to monitor, forecast or manage consumers load. 
E.g., the utility may set a load threshold and the consumers to- 
tal load should never exceed that limit. The HEG also enables the 
utility to remotely control the operational status of schedulable ap- 
pliances for better load or demand-response management. 
The HEG brings the opportunity for rapid development of 
many smart grid DSM services including but not limited to 
home/building automation, eﬃcient load management, Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), dynamic energy pricing, distributed 
power management, etc [9] . A major challenge for the HEG is the 
design of suitable communication framework that can enable the 
utility to remotely manage, conﬁgure or control plethora of het- 
erogeneous devices at geographically dispersed consumer sites. To 
this aim, a standardized communication framework should be de- 
veloped that can address key challenges such as zero-conﬁguration, 
hassle free seamless discovery and networking, interoperability be- 
tween plethora of heterogeneous devices from different manu- 
facturers, plug & play feature, privacy and security. Several re- 
searchers in literature have developed HEG (or gateway in gen- 
eral) that could address one or more of the key challenges e.g., 
auto-discovery [9,11] , interoperability [10–13] , security [14,15] , etc. 
However, the literature still lacks a comprehensive HEG design that 
could address all key challenges. 
The main objective of this paper is to identify key challenges 
in the design of DSM services and develop a more comprehen- 
sive/complete HEG that provides all essential features. Further, the 
HEG should be conﬁgurable and ﬂexible enough to be used for 
any speciﬁc DSM service. To this aim, this paper proposes the de- 
sign of communication frameworks for the HEG based on Univer- 
sal Plug & Play (UPnP) [16] and Group Domain of Interpretation 
(GDOI) [17] enabled secure Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). 
The UPnP enables auto-discovery, zero-conﬁguration and seamless 
communication between the HEG and plethora of heterogeneous 
devices at consumer sites. A standard developed service based on 
UPnP mitigates the interoperability and integration issues between 
devices from different manufacturers. Whereas, the GDOI enabled 
secure HTTP protocol is used for communication between the HEG 
and the utility/electrical grid. The GDOI provides enhanced protec- 
tion for DSM services against cyber attacks due to its unique and 
distinguishing feature of periodic security policies and keying ma- 
terial refreshment. This paper provides clear functional speciﬁca- 
tion towards practically implementing the HEG that could support 
multiple concurrent DSM services. Further, it also functionally eval- 
uates the HEG in real networking environment and presents per- 
formance metrics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents 
background and related work from literature. Section 3 highlights 
the importance of HEG in the development of different smart 
grid DSM services. Section 4 presents the design of proposed sys- 
tem and addresses key challenges. Section 5 presents the design of 
communication frameworks and highlights their unique features. 
Section 6 presents implementations. Section 7 experimentally eval- 
uates the proposed system. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and related work 
Eﬃcient demand-response management is a key factor revolu- 
tionizing legacy grids into smart grids. Authors in [8] proposed a 
methodology for estimating power capacity and managing build- 
ing temperature operation within the DSM system. The system 
meets demand-response requirements of grid while ensuring qual- 
ity of service for end-users. Authors in [18] presented a load man- 
agement service by shifting the operation of deferrable residen- 
tial loads from peak hours and maximizing the use of power from 
Photo-Voltaic (PV) units installed on rooftop of homes/buildings. 
The extra generated electricity from PV units can also be con- 
tributed to the main grid. Authors in [19] proposed a system for 
energy storage optimization under intermittent supply of electric- 
ity. The system ensures continuous supply of electricity for crit- 
ical home appliances by using a predictive scheduling and load 
management mechanism that reduces discomfort level for the con- 
sumers. In short, numerous DSM services will soon become part of 
the smart grid for better load management [7,20] . 
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Although smart grid offers many interesting DSM services, their 
practical realization is very challenging. Authors in [21] investi- 
gated the theoretical and socio-political issues. They have high- 
lighted hurdles from real life experiences, identiﬁed need for in- 
creased consumer participation in energy management and the 
need of effective policy making and standards. A major challenge 
in the realization of DSM services is the communication interface 
that can enable the utility to remotely manage, conﬁgure or con- 
trol plethora of heterogeneous devices at the geographically dis- 
persed consumer sites. An energy gateway at each consumer site 
is the most favorable solution identiﬁed by several researchers 
[9,22,23] . The Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi) alliance ini- 
tially evolved with main focus on the modular design of gateways 
[22] . A gateway developed on top of OSGi for Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices is presented in [24] . It addresses interoperability but 
lacks to address auto-discovery, plug & play and communication 
security issues. Authors in [9,25] also focused on the modular de- 
sign of the HEG for eﬃcient energy management at home. How- 
ever, [9] uses HTTP client-server mechanism that lacks to address 
security, interoperability and integration between heterogeneous 
devices. Whereas, [25] does not focus on the communication as- 
pects. Authors in [26] investigated if the expensive home servers 
could be replaced with low cost and compact gateways. It was 
identiﬁed that the gateway functionalities are not computing in- 
tensive and could be easily supported on low cost Raspberry Pi. 
The features and capabilities of the energy gateway also de- 
pend on the choice of the communication framework. Several re- 
searchers have used MQTT protocol which was originally designed 
for IoT devices due to its small code footprint and low band- 
width requirement. Authors in [10] presented an MQTT based gate- 
way for home energy management. A cloud-based system collects 
the home energy consumption and then schedules the operation 
of home appliances. However, MQTT lacks zero-conﬁguration and 
seamless discovery features. A similar work using MQTT has also 
been presented in [12] . Researchers have also used some other IoT 
protocols for gateway design e.g., CoAP, XMPP, etc. CoAP protocol 
is speciﬁcally designed for constrained devices and has no built-in 
security mechanism but can operate over DTLS security. Whereas, 
XMPP is an application proﬁle of the XML and has standard en- 
coding format for messages. This addresses interoperability issues 
to some extent but it lacks security and seamless auto-discovery 
features. Gateways designed using CoAP and XMPP are presented 
in [27] and [13] , respectively. 
MQTT, CoAP and XMPP are application protocols operating on 
top of TCP/IP using wired Ethernet or wireless communication. 
Many researchers have developed gateways using non-TCP/IP based 
technologies e.g., ZigBee, Bluetooth, etc. Authors in [23,28,29] pre- 
sented gateways for home energy management using ZigBee wire- 
less technology. Whereas, a gateway using connectionless Blue- 
tooth Low Energy as data communication method has been pre- 
sented in [30] . It is worth mentioning that ZigBee and Bluetooth 
are not the best approaches due to compatibility issues, security 
and limited or no support on legacy gateway devices. 
The protocols used in gateway design usually lack a built-in se- 
curity mechanism. It is essential to ensure communication secu- 
rity using additional security technologies. Communication secu- 
rity within the DSM is a major challenge and several researchers 
have analyzed different cyber attacks [31–33] . Authors in [34] in- 
vestigated undetectable or stealthy cyber attacks on AMI service in 
smart grid and performed the risk assessment. They also identi- 
ﬁed that a compromised or hacked communication could result in 
potential theft of electricity. Authors in [35] investigated impact of 
cyber attacks on energy demand communication from consumers 
to the utility. To improve communication security, the authors also 
proposed an Artiﬁcial-Noise (AN)-aided encoded mechanism. Au- 
thors in [14] proposed a privacy-preserving scheme and presented 
it for the AMI service. They combined cryptographic primitives 
such as encryption and identity-committable signatures. Authors 
in [15] presented a lightweight key establishment mechanism for 
smart home energy management service. The proposed proof-of- 
concept provides protection against denial-of-service and eaves- 
dropping attacks. 
The energy gateway should also provide zero-conﬁguration and 
auto-discovery features which are lacking in most gateway de- 
signs in literature. Different existing technologies can be used to 
achieve such features e.g., multicast DNS (mDNS), AllJoyn, IoTiv- 
ity, UPnP, etc. The mDNS standard is published by Apple Inc. in 
RFC 6762 [36] . It is used in most Apple products, Google Chrome- 
cast, Philips Hue, Spotify Connect and many other devices based on 
the Avahi software package. However, the mDNS is not a complete 
communication framework but just service discovery which is its 
main limitation. After discovery, additional protocols are needed 
for communication. E.g., authors in [11] combined mDNS discovery 
with XMPP protocol for IoT devices. Alternatively, AllJoyn, IoTivity 
and UPnP are complex frameworks which provide seamless discov- 
ery and have protocols for communication (command/control) as 
well. The AllJoyn is an open-source software framework presented 
by AllSeen Alliance [37] . Due to universal software framework, it 
enables interoperability between devices supporting AllJoyn. The 
AllJoyn technology has been adopted by several companies includ- 
ing LG, Panasonic and Sony however, its use in consumer prod- 
ucts is still very limited. The IoTivity framework has been devel- 
oped for constraint IoT devices which have limited processing and 
memory resources [38] . It uses CoAP and has plugin for MQTT 
as well. The UPnP technology was originally presented by Open 
Connectivity Foundation (OCF) [16] . It is a complex communica- 
tion framework utilizing several different networking protocols to 
achieve zero-conﬁguration, auto-discovery and seamless communi- 
cation features. At present, UPnP is the most commonly used tech- 
nology and is supported on PCs, printers, copiers, Internet gate- 
ways, routers, Wi-Fi access points, multimedia streaming systems 
and even mobile devices. AllJoyn, IoTivity and UPnP have simi- 
lar goals but the key differences are in their architecture, pro- 
tocol stack and the way they operate. For example, IoTivity uses 
CoAP service discovery, AllJoyn uses mDNS service discovery and 
UPnP uses SSDP protocol for service discovery. IoTivity has noti- 
ﬁcation capability, AllJoyn has publish-subscribe architecture with 
remote method invocation support and UPnP has notiﬁcation, re- 
mote method invocation and eventing capabilities. UPnP can be 
the most favorable choice for the design of energy gateway as it 
is widely adopted/supported on consumer devices, supports event- 
ing as well as command and control features. It supports different 
state variables each indicating a speciﬁc state of the device e.g., 
ON/OFF, idle/busy, power consumption, etc. Further, it immediately 
notiﬁes all its peer devices as soon as a state variable changes. It 
is also worth mentioning that IoTivity, AllSeen Alliance and OCF, 
all merged together in October 2016. Thus, a uniﬁed solution will 
soon be developed that will combine the best of all technologies 
and will also be interoperable and backward compatible with cur- 
rent devices using either technology. 
Although, several researchers have investigated energy gateway 
for DSM services, a comprehensive and complete gateway design is 
still missing. Previous works lack to address at-least one or more 
of the challenges concerning protocol design, zero-conﬁguration, 
auto-discovery, seamless plug & play communication, interoper- 
ability and integration between plethora of heterogeneous devices, 
privacy and security issues. Thus, the objective of this paper is to 
identify all the communication challenges and present the design 
of a more complete energy gateway that can enable multiple con- 
current DSM services. Further, a strong focus is on the communi- 
cation security and privacy to protect sensitive information from 
adversaries. 
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3. Importance of home energy gateways 
The HEG boosts up the development of new DSM services with 
the help of its eﬃcient control and management functionalities at 
the consumer end. It can play a vital role in several evolving DSM 
services including but not limited to the following: 
3.1. Load Management service 
The smart grid Load Management (LM) service can balance 
energy demand with the supply. It enables utility companies to 
use dynamic energy pricing which helps in preventing unexpected 
load-shedding/blackouts [5] . Consumers receive energy price from 
the utility which indirectly represent the current electricity de- 
mand at that moment. Utility companies dynamically increase the 
energy price during peak demand hours to force consumers to re- 
duce their electricity load. Consumers shift their load to low en- 
ergy price periods in order to reduce their electricity bill. The LM 
service offers consumers to prioritize their electrical loads and save 
money by scheduling them to off-peak hours. The HEG plays an 
important role in the design of LM service by continuously com- 
municating and receiving energy price updates from the utility. A 
utility normally manages different zones. Each zone usually has 
different ener gy requirements during different hours of the day 
and can have different ener gy price than other zones. For example 
industrial zones have high energy demands during day time and 
bear higher energy price compared to the residential zones. Thus, 
utility companies will force residential zone and/or industrial zone 
to reduce the load by increasing the energy price at peak demand 
hours. Furthermore, this service may grant control of all appliances 
to the utility who will remotely shutdown the agreed electrical ap- 
pliances during the critically peak demand hours. 
3.2. Home Automation service 
The smart grid Home Automation (HA) service helps in re- 
ducing energy waste by automating the operational periods of all 
home appliances. The role of HEG in the design of HA service is 
vital that activates or deactivates home appliances at pre-speciﬁed 
time. The HEG offers ﬂexibility for consumers to specify conﬁgu- 
ration for each appliance. The functionalities of the HEG can also 
be controlled with the help of sensors deployed at different loca- 
tions at home. Processing the data received from sensors, the HEG 
decides about the operational state of an appliance at a given time 
instant. Instead of local appliances control mechanism at the HEG, 
the control of home appliances may be granted to the utility. The 
utility will deﬁne the use period for different appliances based on 
their power requirement and operational importance. E.g., a con- 
sumer may activate a washing machine which will automatically 
run during the period speciﬁed by the utility. Thus, the utility com- 
pany may allow high power appliances only to operate at low de- 
mand and low energy price periods. 
3.3. Advanced Metering Infrastructure service 
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) service involves 
two way communication between meters and the utility. The AMI 
service performs measurements about the electricity consumption, 
current load, status and diagnostic information from the meters 
and securely communicates them to the utility. The AMI service 
relies on the HEG for effectively establishing two-way communica- 
tion channel for data exchange. The AMI service of the HEG may 
also receive current energy price and demand-response pattern 
from the utility and help in eﬃcient integration of renewables and 
energy storages. 
3.4. Distributed Power Generation service 
The Distributed Power Generation (DPG) service of the smart 
grid deals with micro and nano grids. A micro grid is the group- 
ing of electricity generators (e.g., wind farms, solar panels, etc) and 
consumers over a certain geographical area e.g., a town. It is also 
capable to operate independently (disconnected from the main 
grid) by meeting the electricity demand of the local area. Nano 
grid concept is similar to micro grid but covers a more smaller area 
e.g., a single building or home. The micro and nano grids may also 
contribute electricity to the main grid and need the capability to 
dynamically connect and disconnect from it. It is strictly necessary 
that micro/nano grid is synchronized (same phase, magnitude and 
frequency) to the main grid while connecting in order to prevent 
any physical damage to the equipment. To this aim, time-stamped 
electrical quantities (known as synchrophasors) are transmitted in 
real-time to the control center over public Internet. The HEG could 
play an important role in secure transmission of synchrophasors 
and dynamic connection/disconnection of micro/nano grids from 
the main grid. Further, the HEG may also be communicating with 
the local energy storage devices. 
4. Design of proposed system 
The design of proposed system is depicted in Fig. 2 . It consists 
of utility, HEG and home appliances. The HEG is communicating 
with home appliances in the local network while with the utility 
over the public Internet. Since, two different types of communi- 
cations are involved, the complexity, challenges and requirements 
are different. The HEG communication with home appliance in LAN 
does not face any privacy and security challenges. However, the 
HEG communication with the utility needs to ensure proper se- 
curity measures for protection against potential cyber attacks. To 
this aim, the proposed system in Fig. 2 uses two different types of 
communication frameworks: UPnP and secure HTTP. 
The UPnP communication framework is especially designed for 
the HEG communication with home appliances. UPnP provides 
several interesting features including zero-conﬁguration, auto- 
discovery and seamless networking [16] . After mutual seamless 
discovery, communicating devices retrieve complete service de- 
scription of their peer device (i.e., the capabilities of a device). Fur- 
ther, it allows devices to send and receive commands (i.e., control) 
that result in certain actions performed by the peer device. Ac- 
tions performed by a UPnP device may result in status change (e.g., 
power state transition) which is immediately notiﬁed to all peer 
devices (i.e., eventing). The detailed design of UPnP based commu- 
nication framework is presented in Section 5.1 . 
The HTTP client/server approach is used for communication be- 
tween the HEG and utility company. Since, the communication 
passes over insecure public Internet, the GDOI [17] based secu- 
rity mechanism is proposed as the most effective approach for en- 
suring integrity and conﬁdentiality. The GDOI provides enhanced 
security due to periodic refreshment of security credentials [17] . 
The continuous refreshment of security policies provide best pos- 
sible protection against cryptanalysis and potential cyber attacks. 
It can be observed in Fig. 2 that the GDOI is based on Internet Se- 
curity Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) for se- 
cure authentication between communicating devices over an inse- 
cure network. ISAKMP identity protection mechanism consists of 
three different exchanges: (i) negotiation of security policies be- 
tween communicating devices (i.e., encryption and signatures al- 
gorithms, key size, validity, authentication method, etc), (ii) key 
establishment mechanism which is based on Diﬃe Hellman pub- 
lic key cryptography, and (iii) secure authentication using security 
key established by Diﬃe Hellman approach. After successful au- 
thentication, a new security key is established between the HEG 
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Fig. 2. Overview of proposed system. 
and the utility for protecting HTTP based communication. This se- 
curity key is refreshed periodically based on agreed security poli- 
cies. In GDOI, key generation and refreshment mechanism can be 
local (as shown in Fig. 2 ) or based on an external key distribution 
center. The detailed design of GDOI based secure HTTP communi- 
cation framework is presented in Section 5.2 . 
The basic requirements and design challenges for the proposed 
system (in Fig. 2 ) can be classiﬁed into three categories: (i) chal- 
lenges for home appliances, (ii) challenges for the HEG, and (iii) 
challenges for the utility company. 
4.1. Challenges for home appliances 
The home appliances need to have the following basic capabil- 
ities: 
1. Appliances need to have deployment ﬂexibility. They should be 
able to operate in any network topology (e.g., bus, ring, star, 
mesh or hybrid). 
2. Appliances need to offer interoperability and Integration ﬂexi- 
bility. Appliances from different manufacturers need to support 
common set of features and communicate without any special 
conﬁgurations or speciﬁc requirements. 
3. For convenience of consumers, appliances should operate as 
plug and play. They should be able to automatically discover 
the HEG in the network and seamlessly communicate with it 
without requiring any network settings from users. 
4. Appliances from different manufacturers need to implement a 
standardized communication framework for easy communica- 
tion with the HEG. Section 5.1 presents the design of a service 
based on UPnP framework which can be implemented by any 
network device. 
5. Appliances need to have unique identity as the HEG might be 
covering a big network and different subnets. Therefore, IP ad- 
dress may not be a good choice, instead Universally Unique 
IDentiﬁer (UUID) should be used. UUID has a standard format 
and size (128 bits) and used to uniquely identify a device in the 
system. 
6. Appliances need to know their operational/power state and im- 
mediately notify the HEG over suitable communication frame- 
work in case of any change. A kernel module can be developed 
for tracking power state transitions as used in our experimental 
testbed in Section 7 . 
7. Appliances need to have a mechanism to update their power 
state based on the commands received from the HEG. The 
HEG may instruct a device to transition into a low power 
sleep/standby state or wakeup from standby state. 
8. Appliances need to have a mechanism for remote switching ON 
or wake-up. Experiments reported in Section 7 were performed 
assuming a standard PC as an appliance that supports re- 
mote wake-up mechanisms known as Wake-On-LAN (WOL) and 
Wake-on-Wireless-LAN (WoWLAN). Support for such mecha- 
nisms could be easily integrated in future home appliances. 
9. The home network should be protected from unauthorized ac- 
cess using standard Firewall. Firewall provides protection from 
intruders for unnecessary switching ON/OFF home appliances. 
10. Appliances need to have built-in intelligence and avoid obeying 
the HEG commands under certain conditions. Under some crit- 
ical conditions or user need, operation of an appliance may be 
strictly necessary. Such situations need to be communicated to 
the HEG to improve its decision making for better energy man- 
agement at home. 
4.2. Challenges for the HEG 
The functionalities of the HEG depend on the DSM service. 
However, it must have the following generic capabilities: 
1. It should be always available and easily accessible by the utility 
and all home appliances at any time. 
2. It should be able to communicate with appliances from differ- 
ent manufacturers by implementing a standardized communi- 
cation framework. 
3. It should be able to uniquely identify each appliance based on 
UUID and keep track of its operational status and capabilities. 
4. It should have built-in intelligence that can automate the use of 
home appliances based on instructions received from the util- 
ity. 
5. It should support a standardized mechanism for switching ON 
or waking up an appliance e.g., WOL, WoWLAN, etc. 
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6. It should implement a standardized security mechanism for 
protecting integrity and conﬁdentiality of communication with 
the utility. 
7. HEG software should have low footprint and easily executable 
on constraint legacy home gateways with limited memory and 
processing power. 
4.3. Challenges for the utility company 
The functionalities of the utility company depend on the type 
of the DSM service with the following generic capabilities: 
1. It should be able to uniquely identify each HEG at different con- 
sumer sites and keep track of all appliances and their total in- 
stantaneous power consumption. 
2. It should implement a standardized security mechanism for en- 
suring communication security with the HEG. 
3. Based on the type of the DSM service, utility will perform dif- 
ferent types of functionalities. In general, it should be able to 
send different commands to the HEG. The HEG will perform 
certain actions and return the results back to the utility. 
5. Design of communication frameworks 
It can be observed in Fig. 2 that the HEG communicates with 
the utility as well as with home appliances. Communication with 
the utility is remote over the public Internet while with home ap- 
pliances, it is local. Thus, the proposed system uses two different 
types of communication frameworks: UPnP for LAN communica- 
tion and GDOI based secure HTTP for communication over insecure 
public Internet. This section presents the design of both communi- 
cation frameworks. 
5.1. UPnP based communication framework 
The choice of UPnP based communication framework for home 
network is motivated due to auto-discovery, zero-conﬁguration and 
seamless networking features [16] . A UPnP device does not require 
any conﬁguration and automatically connects and communicates 
with its peer devices. Further, UPnP technology is supported by 
heterogeneous devices from different manufacturers without caus- 
ing any interoperability issues. UPnP is a complex architecture that 
can be customized in variety of ways. This makes UPnP as the most 
favorable choice for the HEG due to the presence of plethora of 
different devices from different manufacturers in the home envi- 
ronment. The UPnP technology enables the HEG to automatically 
discover connected home appliances, monitor their power status 
and control their operations. 
The UPnP architecture is built upon several protocols: (i) Simple 
Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) for auto-discovery of network 
devices, (ii) General Event Notiﬁcation Architecture (GENA) for no- 
tiﬁcation of status updates, and (iii) Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP) for sending commands. The SSDP operates on top of HTTPU 
(an extension of HTTP protocol that uses UDP as transport protocol 
instead of TCP) whereas SOAP and GENA protocols operate on top 
of HTTP. GENA also operates on top of HTTP-MU (HTTP using UDP 
multicast) when the advertisements or notiﬁcations are sent to a 
group of devices. 
5.1.1. UPnP device types 
The UPnP technology speciﬁes two types of devices: Controlled 
Device (CD) and Control Point (CP). The role of CP is similar to a 
client sending instructions/commands which are responded by the 
speciﬁc service of CD. 
Fig. 3 depicts the generic structure of a UPnP CP. The Device 
Manager manages the list of all discovered devices over the net- 
work and retrieves their device and service description ﬁles. The 
Fig. 3. UPnP Control Point. 
Fig. 4. UPnP Controlled Device. 
Action Manager invokes different actions on the CD related to dif- 
ferent services. The Event Manager manages different events such 
as changes in the state variables. It is also responsible to periodi- 
cally renew the device and service subscriptions before their reg- 
istration expires. Subscription renewal is particularly important to 
know about the absence of CD if it accidentally leaves the network 
due to cable disconnection or any other reason. 
Fig. 4 depicts the generic structure of a UPnP CD which is offer- 
ing one or more services. The Description Manager is responsible 
for managing the device description as well as the description of 
all services it is offering. The device and services descriptions are 
expressed in XML ﬁles. The Description Manager is also responsi- 
ble for periodic advertisement of CD in the network and providing 
relevant description ﬁles. The Services Manager within a CD man- 
ages the implementation of different services and their supported 
actions. The Services Manager receives commands from the CP af- 
ter which it executes a particular action. It is also responsible to 
keep the CP updated about the changes in CD status. 
5.1.2. Communication paradigm 
In the UPnP based communication system, a device either im- 
plements a CP or a CD (only one device is capable of sending com- 
mands). To achieve two way command and control, both the HEG 
and home appliances in the proposed system implement a CP as 
well as a CD as shown in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 also depicts basic communi- 
cation semantics consisting of the following steps: 
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Table 1 
Actions provided by the UPnP power management service offered by home appliances. 
Action name Arguments Direction Allowed values Action description 
GetPowerState UUID Input N/A Provides the HEG its current power state. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
PowerState Output ON/OFF/Standby 
RegID Output Integer 
WakeUpMethod UUID Input N/A Informs the HEG on how to wake it up from standby. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
Method Output WOL/WoWLAN 
RegID Output Integer 
OperationOn UUID Input N/A Appliance starts functioning its job. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
RegID Output Integer 
OperationOff UUID Input N/A Appliance stops functioning its job. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
RegID Output Integer 
GoToStandby UUID Input N/A Appliance goes to standby state. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
RegID Output Integer 
StandbyPeriod UUID Input N/A Appliance will stay in standby state during speciﬁed 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 start and stop period. 
StartTime Input HH:MM:SS 
StopTime Input HH:MM:SS 
RegID Output Integer 
Withdraw UUID Input N/A Appliance cancels a speciﬁed action previously registered. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 

























Fig. 5. Proposed UPnP based communication scenario between the HEG and home 
appliances. 
• Step-0 Addressing: The home appliance gets an IP address using 
DHCP (i.e., the HEG also works as gateway device). 
• Step-1 Discovery: A UPnP device advertises itself and discovers 
other devices of interest in the network. 
• Step-2 Description: The CP in each device retrieves CD and ser- 
vice descriptions of its discovered devices. 
• Step-3 Control: A UPnP device can invoke an action on other 
UPnP devices. 
• Step-4 Eventing: A CD updates other UPnP devices about any 
changes in its operational status. 
• Step-5 Presentation: A CP retrieves CD information from the pre- 
sentation URL of the CD. 
5.1.3. Description of services 
As speciﬁed in Section 4 , the HEG and home appliances need to 
implement standardized communication services. Each service im- 
plements one or more actions which can be invoked by peer UPnP 
devices. Table 1 provides the description of UPnP power manage- 
ment service for home appliances. With the knowledge of UPnP 
service description, the HEG can launch different types of actions 
on home appliances. The proposed service in Table 1 needs to be 
implemented by all home appliances. It enables the HEG to launch 
similar types of actions on all home appliances. The UPnP service 
also consists of a set of state variables. State variables represent 
the current state of the device/appliance. Table 1 also lists the state 
variables for home appliances (i.e., PowerState, Method, StartTime, 
StopTime, etc). 
Similarly, the HEG needs to implement a standardized service 
to achieve interoperability and zero-conﬁguration with home ap- 
pliances. Table 2 provides the description of proposed UPnP service 
offered by the HEG. It offers similar types of actions invokable by 
all home appliances. 
5.2. GDOI based secure HTTP communication framework 
The GDOI based secure HTTP communication framework is used 
for communication between the HEG and the utility. Since the 
communication takes place over the public Internet, the informa- 
tion security becomes crucial. It is likely possible that the HEGs 
may be manufactured by different vendors. A generalized and stan- 
dardized communication framework is necessary to achieve ease of 
integration and interoperability. The HTTP can be the most suitable 
choice as communication protocol due to its structured meta-data 
and non-restricted ﬂow through Firewalls (at-least in outgoing di- 
rection). However, the HTTP protocol itself is insecure and vulnera- 
ble for cyber attacks targeting integrity and conﬁdentiality of com- 
munication. 
The proposed system in Fig. 2 is a group-based system where 
multiple HEGs will be communicating with a single utility com- 
pany. Thus, the utility is coordinating with a group of HEGs and 
requires an eﬃcient group-based security mechanism. The GDOI 
emerged as a most successful group-based security mechanism 
[17] . Key features of the proposed security mechanism include: 
(i) secure key establishment over public Internet using Diﬃe Hell- 
man approach, (ii) protection against spooﬁng by the use of cryp- 
tographic signature inside packets, (iii) encryption of packets based 
on multiple supported algorithms for achieving high level of con- 
ﬁdentiality and protection against integrity attacks, (iv) periodic 
update of security policies and keying material to achieve maxi- 
mum possible protection against cryptanalysis, and (v) easily cus- 
tomizable for real-time communication and supported by plethora 
of heterogeneous devices using any speciﬁc protocol. These unique 
qualities make the GDOI a suitable security framework for protect- 
ing communication between the HEGs and the utility. 
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Table 2 
Actions provided by the UPnP service offered by the HEG. 
Action name Arguments Direction Allowed values Action description 
WakeUpTime UUID Input N/A The HEG will wake up the appliance at speciﬁed time. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
Time Input HH:MM:SS 
RegID Output Integer 
NoStandbyPeriod UUID Input N/A The HEG will never put the appliance into standby 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 state during the speciﬁed start and stop period. 
StartTime Input HH:MM:SS 
StopTime Input HH:MM:SS 
RegID Output Integer 
Withdraw UUID Input N/A The HEG cancels a speciﬁed action previously registered. 
Address Input IPv4/IPv6 
RegID Input Integer 
GCKS
Utility HEG










Fig. 6. Proposed GDOI-based secure HTTP communication framework. 
The GDOI security model consists of two types of devices: 
Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) and Group Members (GM). 
GCKS is responsible for providing security policies (e.g., signature 
algorithm, encryption algorithm, key life type, key length, key va- 
lidity, authentication method, etc) and keying material to group 
members. The group members then utilizes acquired security cre- 
dentials for secure communication among one another and with 
GCKS. In the proposed system in Fig. 2 , the utility plays the role of 
GCKS as well as a group member. Whereas, the HEGs function as 
group members. The GDOI mechanism utilizes three types of keys: 
1. Pair-wise Key: Pair-wise key is either pre-distributed or secretly 
established using any public key cryptography mechanism. This 
paper reports implementations based on Diﬃe Hellman mecha- 
nism which enables the HEG and the utility to establish a secret 
key over the public Internet. 
2. Key Encryption Key (KEK): After successful authentication and 
pair-wise key establishment, GCKS provides KEK and its associ- 
ated security policies to the HEG. The acquired security policies 
and keying material is then used to protect any future commu- 
nication in which GCKS provides key or security policies up- 
dates to the HEG. 
3. Traﬃc Encryption Key (TEK): The KEK is used for encryption 
of messages in which the utility provides TEK to the HEGs. 
The TEK is then used to encrypt/decrypt two-way messages ex- 
changed over HTTP between the utility and the HEG. 
The proposed GDOI-based secure communication framework is 
depicted in Fig. 6 . The GCKS is internal part of the utility in the 
proposed system but depicted as separate standalone entity in 
Fig. 6 for the sake of clarity. The security mechanism consists of 
two phases: 
• Phase 1: This phase is known as authentication and pair-wise 
key establishment phase using Internet Security Association 
and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). The HEG and the util- 
ity send a request to GCKS for security policies related to KEK 
and TEK (known as Group-Key-Pull). The acquired security poli- 
cies are then used for communication between the HEG and the 
utility. 
• Phase 2: This phase is known as Group-Key-Push. It is worth to 
mention that both KEK and TEK in the GDOI mechanism have 
certain validity and must be replaced periodically. GCKS uses 
Group-Key-Push messages to provide KEK and TEK to the HEG 
and the utility before the expiry of current security credentials. 
6. Implementations 
The proposed system consists of three software entities: (i) 
home appliance, (ii) HEG and (iii) utility. The basic structure of 
each software entity is shown in Fig. 7 . Note that home appliances 
and the HEG communicate using UPnP technology whereas the 
utility and the HEG communicate over HTTP. All software entities 
were developed in Linux OS using standard C/C++ programming 
language with the help of libupnp libraries and boost libraries. 
6.1. Home appliance software 
Fig. 7 (a) depicts the basic components of software for home ap- 
pliances. It implements both UPnP CP as well as CD. For sake of 
simplicity, it does not show the functional blocks of CP and CD 
which could be referenced in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively. UPnP CP 
and CD implement all the functionalities reported in Section 5.1 . 
The CP is used to instruct the HEG with different conditions (e.g., 
only run this appliance when energy price is below certain thresh- 
old or operation of this appliance is crucial and should not be 
stopped under any condition for DSM load management service, 
etc). The CD receives commands from the HEG to control the oper- 
ational status of the appliance (e.g., put appliance into sleep state, 
stop or resume the operations of the appliance, etc). 
The home appliance software provides all the basic functional- 
ities reported in Section 4.1 . The use of UPnP technology provides 
plug & play features and deployment ﬂexibility. The CP and CD use 
SSDP protocol for discovery which enables the HEG to seamlessly 
discover the home appliances as soon as they are connected to the 
network. The interoperability and integration issues (between de- 
vices from different manufacturers) are addressed through the de- 
sign of a service with common set of features. At present, the CD 
in home appliance software implements the service described in 
Table 1 . The implementation of this service by all home appliances 
enables the HEG to execute similar actions on them. The UPnP CD 
(see Fig. 4 ) also includes device/appliance and its service descrip- 
tions which are saved in the XML ﬁles. During discovery, the HEG 
downloads the device/appliance XML description that also includes 
a UUID. The HEG uniquely identify an appliance based on its UUID. 
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Fig. 7. Basic software structures in the proposed system. 
Note that the CD service description consists of a list of state vari- 
ables each indicating a speciﬁc operational state of the device (e.g., 
busy, idle, power state, sleep periods, etc). As soon as a state vari- 
able value changes, the UPnP CD immediately notiﬁes the HEG. 
The software for home appliances also implements a kernel mod- 
ule which tracks the operational status e.g., ON, OFF, low power 
sleep, etc. Whenever the appliance operational state changes, ker- 
nel module immediately notiﬁes the CD which eventually notiﬁes 
the HEG. Based on the state variables, the home appliance soft- 
ware may deny executing a certain action requested by the HEG 
(e.g., appliance is busy and the HEG requested it to turn OFF or go 
to sleep state). Since, software is executed on Linux OS, its built-in 
system calls are used to change the power state of the appliance. 
When the HEG wants to wake-up an appliance, it uses the WOL 
mechanism which is supported by most modern Network Interface 
Cards (NICs). 
6.2. HEG software 
Fig. 7 (b) depicts simpliﬁed structure of the HEG software. Like- 
wise home appliances, it also implements both UPnP CP (func- 
tional blocks in Fig. 3 ) as well as CD (functional blocks in Fig. 4 ) for 
enabling two way command and control features. The CP is used 
for controlling the operational status of home appliances. While 
CD receives instructions from home appliances e.g., when to op- 
erate an appliance in case of dynamic energy pricing. The Util- 
ity Client communicates with the utility over HTTP protocol. It 
enables the utility to communicate with local implementation of 
the DSM services e.g., retrieving current meter reading, reducing 
load in home, etc. The GCKS client communicates with the GCKS 
to acquire security credentials which are used to protect HTTP 
communication between the HEG and the utility. Further, it is re- 
sponsible to keep security credentials up-to-date by periodically 
receiving them from the GCKS. Current implementations support 
AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM and AES-256-CBC as encryption algo- 
rithms. The supported signature algorithms include: HMAC-SHA- 
256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 and AES-GMAC-128. 
The HEG software provides all the basic functionalities reported 
in Section 4.2 . Since, the HEG and home appliances are using UPnP 
technology, they seamlessly discover and communicate with each 
other without facing any interoperability issues. At present, the CD 
of the HEG software implements the service described in Table 2 . 
It enables all home appliances to send similar commands to the 
HEG. Note that the HEG software also implements WOL technology 
i.e., remote network-based trigger of home appliances. The HEG ac- 
complishes this by broadcasting a speciﬁc message (also known as 
magic packet) in the local network. The magic packet contains in 
its payload 6 Bytes of all 255 (FF FF FF FF FF FF in hexadecimal) 
followed by the 48-bit MAC address of the sleeping appliance re- 
peated 16 times (total payload size 102 Bytes). When the NIC of the 











Fig. 8. Experimental testbed. 
up interrupt line on the motherboard and the appliance becomes 
fully operational again. 
6.3. Utility software 
To be quite generic for any type of smart grid DSM service, 
Fig. 7 (c) depicts the basic structure of the utility software. Power 
System block is service-speciﬁc. It is providing different power sys- 
tem credentials to the behavioral Rules e.g., energy price (if the 
proposed system is implementing dynamic energy pricing), de- 
mand and supply information (i.e., load management service), etc. 
Each Rule implements a speciﬁc DSM service e.g., AMI, load man- 
agement, home automation, etc. It invokes certain actions based on 
conditions met on the data supplied by Power System block. The 
utility software also implements HTTP client and server for com- 
munication and invoking actions on the HEG. The HTTP communi- 
cation security is ensured using the GDOI security mechanism. The 
HTTP block is communicating with GCKS to determine which secu- 
rity policies and keying material to use to protect the HTTP com- 
munication. The GCKS implements all of the operations discussed 
in Section 5.2 . It is worth to mention that GCKS does not operate 
over HTTP but communicates with GCKS-client on the HEG using 
standard UDP protocol. 
7. Evaluation of proposed system 
Fig. 8 depicts the experimental testbed used for the evaluation 
of proposed system. It consists of a utility company which is com- 
munication with the HEG at different homes. The HEG software 
is expected to be executed on legacy gateway devices. However, 
due to no availability of development gateway kit, it has been exe- 
cuted on a very low power device i.e., Raspberry Pi v2 (ARMv6 CPU 
700 MHz, 512 MB memory and 3.8 W full load power consump- 
tion) for experimental purpose. In future, home appliances such 
as TV, refrigerators, heaters, boilers, air conditioning and lighten- 
ing system will also become part of the home network. However, 
a standard desktop PC was assumed as basic home appliance in 
Fig. 8 just for the sake of experiments. 
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Fig. 9. Number of packets exchanged and the average packet size during different 
UPnP events. 
The ﬁrst step of evaluation is to check if all the software enti- 
ties functionally behave correctly. The practical demonstrations in 
testbed veriﬁed the correct functioning of the utility, the HEG and 
home appliances. The HEG was able to successfully discover home 
appliances (i.e., PCs) in transparent and seamless manner without 
any conﬁgurations hassle due to the unique features of UPnP. This 
highlights the importance of UPnP in proposed system to achieve 
interoperability and integration between appliances from different 
manufacturers. The HEG was able to promptly discover and com- 
municate with the home appliances as soon as they connect to the 
network. All UPnP control and command functionalities reported in 
Tables 1 and 2 were successfully tested along with the functionali- 
ties of the kernel module. The kernel module successfully tracked 
the operational status of home appliances and immediately noti- 
ﬁed the HEG in case of updates. The HEG was able to control the 
home appliances using built-in system calls available on any Oper- 
ating System (although tests were performed on Linux OS). These 
system calls then in turn changes the operational/power state of 
the home appliances. The HEG was also able to wake up home 
appliances from low-power sleep states by sending WOL packets. 
The functionalities of GDOI based security mechanism (reported in 
Section 5.2 ) were also successfully veriﬁed that protected the HTTP 
communication between the HEG and the utility. 
The next step of evaluation is the measurement and assess- 
ment of different performance metrics. The following subsections 
present the measurement of different performance critical fac- 
tors such as communication overhead, memory requirement, band- 
width requirement, communication latencies, etc. Further, security 
strength of the GDOI mechanism has also been analyzed. 
7.1. Communication overhead 
Communication overhead is considered as one of the important 
performance factor for any protocol. Indirectly, it represents the 
maximum size of data that can be carried by a single packet. Fur- 
ther, communication overhead is also linked with bandwidth re- 
quirement. A protocol with high overhead will potentially operate 
slower on low bandwidth links. 
We performed the overhead analysis for different UPnP events 
including discovery, device and action registration, state variable 
updates and device de-registration. The test were performed over 
the period of 12 min during which the home appliance registers 
with the HEG, the HEG invokes a control action on the appliance 
by putting it into sleep state, the HEG wakes up again the appli- 
ance using WOL mechanism and ﬁnally the appliance de-registers 
with the HEG. Fig. 9 depicts the number of packets exchanged 
and the average packet size during different UPnP events. It can 
Fig. 10. Total Bytes exchanged during different UPnP events. 
be observed that large number of packets were exchanged dur- 
ing the steady-state condition. However, most of the packets ex- 
changed under steady-state condition are for periodic presence ad- 
vertisement. Such packets are very small in size. The discovery 
and description packets are very large in size. It is due to the 
fact that both the HEG and home appliance download complete 
UPnP service descriptions of each other. Power state notiﬁcations 
are very infrequent and are transmitted only when power state of 
the home appliance changes. The total Bytes exchanged during dif- 
ferent UPnP events are analyzed in Fig. 10 . It shows that most Bytes 
are exchanged during appliance discovery/registration and steady 
state. For the sake of clarity, Fig. 11 depicts percentage distribution 
of packets during different UPnP events. 
In Fig. 12 , we classiﬁed the overhead into real information in- 
side packets, overhead due to UPnP formatting of real data, over- 
head due to UPnP formatting and packet header and total over- 
head due to UPnP semantics. Fig. 12 also depicts that the packets 
are quite large in device registration and de-registration phases. It 
is due to the fact that both, HEG and home appliance download 
complete CD and service descriptions expressed in the XML for- 
mat. The overhead analysis conﬁrmed that the large size packets 
are quite infrequent while the frequently exchanged packets under 
steady state condition are very small in size. Although, each packet 
consists of more than 80% overhead Bytes, but it does not affect 
the system reliability when the frequently exchanged packets are 
very small in size. 
7.2. Resource requirements 
This section analyzes the required resources for proposed sys- 
tem in terms of memory and bandwidth requirement. For smooth 
and reliable operations, minimum required resources must be 
available. Devices running the utility and home appliance soft- 
ware packages might be equipped with enough memory. However, 
legacy gateway devices are equipped with low memory (typically 
8MB, 16MB or 32MB). To this aim, we also analyzed the memory 
requirement for the HEG software in Table 3 . The HEG software 
requires 5.12MB of memory due to the implementation of com- 
plex UPnP technology and GDOI security mechanism. However, the 
memory requirement is still lower than the available memory on 
legacy gateway devices. 
Table 3 also presents bandwidth requirement for both, UPnP 
and GDOI based HTTP communication frameworks. Bandwidth is 
the most critical factor for any protocol. Protocols with high over- 
head and high data transmission rates can cause traﬃc congestion 
on low bandwidth links or even the packet loss. It can be ob- 
served in Table 3 that the bandwidth requirement is signiﬁcantly 
low compared to available technologies today (Gigabit Ethernet: 
1 Gbps, wireless 802.11b: 11 Mbps, wireless 802.11n: 600 Mbps, 
ADSL lite: 1.5 Mbps, ADSL2+: 24 Mbps, etc). UPnP has high com- 
Please cite this article as: R. Khan, S.U. Khan, Design and implementation of UPnP-based energy gateway for demand side management 
in smart grid, Journal of Industrial Information Integration (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jii.2017.07.001 
R. Khan, S.U. Khan / Journal of Industrial Information Integration 0 0 0 (2017) 1–14 11 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 






Discovery & Descripon Steady State








Discovery & Descripon Steady State
Acon Registraon Power State Noﬁcaon
UPnP un-subscripon
(b)
Fig. 11. UPnP overhead analysis: (a) Percentage of total packets exchanged during different UPnP events, (b) Percentage of total Bytes exchanged during different UPnP 
events. 
Fig. 12. UPnP overhead analysis in the proposed system. 
Table 3 
Latency analysis and resource requirements. 
Memory requirements 
Utility Software HEG Software Appliance Software 
3.07MB 5.12MB 4.53MB 
Communication Latency Analysis 
UPnP Communication HTTP Communication 
96.33 ms 1.29 s 
Bandwidth Requirements 
UPnP Communication HTTP Communication 
1.48 kbps 0.37 kbps 
munication overhead but still has very low bandwidth require- 
ment. This is due to low packet transmission rates in UPnP. 
7.3. Communication latencies 
Communication latencies can severely impair the performance 
of time-critical applications. Low latencies are critically important 
in our proposed system as long HTTP communication delays may 
prevent the HEG from receiving updates on security policies and 
keying material before the expiry of previous security credentials. 
Long UPnP communication delays may prevent transmission of 
power state notiﬁcations from home appliances to the HEG (such 
notiﬁcations must be transferred in shortest possible time before 
the appliance actually enters into sleep/OFF state). 
Table 3 presents communication latencies for both, UPnP and 
HTTP communication frameworks. The reported latencies take into 
account software processing latency (i.e., encoding/decoding of 
packets) as well as network latency (i.e., packet latency to traverse 
the network). The network latency depends on the available band- 
width and could be high on low bandwidth channels. Whereas, 
software processing latency depends on the processing power of 
the device (i.e., Raspberry Pi in our experiments). The latencies 
of encryption and signatures algorithms also impact the software 
processing latency. Fig. 13 presents minimum, maximum, average 
and standard deviation of processing latencies observed for differ- 
ent types of supported encryption and signature algorithms over 
100 trials. It can be observed that processing latencies depend on 
the type of algorithm used. However, the average value is always 
less than 10 ms. Due to very low processing latencies, the function- 
alities of developed software entities are not negatively affected. 
The UPnP communication latency between the HEG and home ap- 
pliances is very low (see Table 3 ). When the kernel receives power 
state transition request, appliance normally takes 1–2 s for freezing 
operations and entering into sleep/OFF state. Due to very low UPnP 
communication and processing latencies, the home appliances (i.e., 
PCs in our experiments) can successfully notify their power state 
transitions to the HEG just before the power state transitions ac- 
tually take place. The reported HTTP communication latency in 
Table 3 between the HEG and utility is a bit high. A signiﬁcant por- 
tion of this latency is contributed by NO-IP dynamic DNS service 
used in our experiments. The HTTP communication latency will 
be very small if the third-party DNS service is not used. However, 
GCKS provides updates on security policies and keying material to 
HEGs 5 s before the expiry of previous security credentials in cur- 
rent implementations. Due to such safety margin, HTTP communi- 
cation latency does not negatively impact the functionalities of the 
utility and the HEG. 
7.4. Security analysis 
This section analyzes the importance of security mechanism 
for HTTP based communication between the utility and the HEG. 
Since, HTTP does not have a built-in security mechanism, it is vul- 
nerable for different types of cyber attacks. These attacks may im- 
pair the communication, cause ﬁnancial loss to the utility and con- 
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Fig. 13. Observed latencies for supported algorithms averaged over 100 packets. 
sumers or may cause physical damage to equipment depending on 
the DSM service under consideration. This paper analyzes vulner- 
abilities based on well known CIA (Conﬁdentiality, Integrity, Avail- 
ability) model. The HTTP protocol in its standard form offers no 
conﬁdentiality, no integrity and availability that can be easily tar- 
geted. Further, it is highly vulnerable to reconnaissance attacks. 
The unauthorized learning in reconnaissance enables the attacker 
to launch more sophisticated attacks such as authentication/access, 
Man In The Middle (MITM), replay/reﬂection and Denial of Service 
(DoS). Authentication or access attack provides an adversary the 
unauthorized access to the HEG or the utility. After successful at- 
tack, the adversary may execute unnecessary actions with the ob- 
jective of stealing information, causing ﬁnancial loss or damage to 
physical equipment. The attacker in MITM attack can hijack and 
modify packets between the HEG and the utility and force them to 
perform unintentionally misleading decisions. Replay or reﬂection 
attack is somehow similar to MITM but instead of modifying pack- 
ets, it records the communication between the HEG and the utility. 
The recorded packets are later played back to deceive the HEG or 
the utility with out-dated packets. An adversary may also launch 
DoS attack by ﬂooding the HEG or the utility with high data rate 
packets to exhaust available resources (e.g., memory, bandwidth, 
CPU, etc) and make it non-responsive. 
The GDOI security mechanism can provide strong protection for 
HTTP communication against different types of attacks. It provides 
protection against reconnaissance/eavesdropping through encryp- 
tion. Authentication or access attacks could be easily prevented 
as the adversary or unauthorized device cannot retrieve security 
policies and keying material from GCKS. Without the knowledge 
of keying material (KEK, TEK) and security policies (e.g., encryp- 
tion algorithm, authentication algorithm, signature algorithm, key 
validity, etc), MITM attacks could not be executed. The periodic 
security policies and keying material update feature of the GDOI 
provides protection against cryptanalysis as well as replay attacks. 
The HEG or the utility can easily identify replayed packets as the 
old recorded packets will be based on expired security policies. The 
GDOI also signiﬁcantly reduces the strength of DoS attack by using 
cookies inside each packet. Based on cookies, the GDOI can easily 
identify DoS packets and simply discard them without processing 
to save CPU and memory resources. Even though, its not the abso- 
lute protection against DoS attack, but the impact of DoS attack is 
signiﬁcantly reduced. Table 4 summarizes the effectiveness of GDOI 
security mechanism against different types of cyber attacks. 
8. Conclusion 
The integration of ICT in smart grid provides enormous op- 
portunities for eﬃcient management and utilization of electricity 
at the demand side. The concept of HEG has recently been pro- 
posed in literature that enables rapid prototyping of new DSM ser- 
vices which could never be imagined before. However, literature 
Table 4 
Security analysis of HTTP-based communication between the utility and the 
HEG. 
Without GDOI With GDOI 
CIA Model Conﬁdentiality None Strong 
Integrity None Strong 
Availability Vulnerable Vulnerable 
Attack Type Reconnaissance Vulnerable Protected 
Authentication/Access Vulnerable Protected 
Man In The Middle (MITM) Vulnerable Protected 
Replay / Reﬂection Vulnerable Protected 
Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerable Vulnerable 
still lacks a comprehensive HEG that is equipped with all essen- 
tial features such as zero-conﬁguration, hassle free seamless dis- 
covery and networking, interoperability between plethora of het- 
erogeneous devices/appliances from different manufacturers, cus- 
tomers privacy and communication security. 
This paper presented a more complete design of the HEG that 
can easily integrate multiple concurrent DSM services. In particu- 
lar, it identiﬁed key challenges in the design of DSM services and 
proposed solution using the HEG equipped with UPnP and GDOI 
based secure HTTP communication frameworks. The paper identi- 
ﬁed that UPnP is the ideal choice for communication between the 
HEG and home appliances. A standard service developed based on 
UPnP can provide auto-discovery and seamless plug & play com- 
munication features. Further, UPnP also addresses interoperability 
and integration issues between the HEG and plethora of home ap- 
pliances. This paper evaluated the effectiveness of UPnP commu- 
nication framework based on experiments performed in real net- 
working environment. 
To ensure communication security between the HEG and the 
utility, this paper also presented the design of an effective GDOI- 
based security mechanism. It has been analyzed that the GDOI has 
several distinguishing features which provide best possible protec- 
tion against eavesdropping, reconnaissance, connection hijacking, 
authentication/access attack, replay/reﬂection attack, man in the 
middle and DoS attacks. The periodic security policies and keying 
material refreshment makes the GDOI a very strong security mech- 
anism against cyber attacks. Thus, the GDOI can be a well suited 
security mechanism for the design of emerging DSM services. 
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